Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage in Targeting People Under the Law of Armed Conflict by Nelson, Krista
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 3
9-1-2013
Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage in
Targeting People Under the Law of Armed Conflict
Krista Nelson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
For more information, please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Krista Nelson, Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage in Targeting People Under the Law of Armed Conflict, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l &
Comp. Law 86 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol14/iss1/3
Article 
 
Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage 
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Conflict 
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Abstract 
The law of armed conflict (LOAC) requires that attacks on 
objects promise a military advantage, but allows attacks on certain 
categories of people regardless of utility.  This Article compares the 
law on targeting people and objects and suggests that the law on 
targeting people should be reformed to include the advantage 
requirement that governs the targeting of objects.  Other proposals 
to refine the law on targeting people draw from law enforcement or 
peacetime human rights law; critics claim that those proposals 
inappropriately treat war like peace, and armed forces like police.  
By contrast, this Article’s proposal draws from LOAC itself and 
would help tailor the law to the strategic concerns at the heart of 
military operations.  Indeed, this proposal would advance LOAC’s 
fundamental effort to prohibit useless violence, extending the 
requirement of advantageous attacks to people. 
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Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage 
in Targeting People Under the Law of Armed 
Conflict 
 
Krista Nelson 
 
Introduction 
 
 The question of who may be attacked under the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC) has given rise to controversy and uncertainty.1 The 
practice of targeted killing in counterterrorism operations has 
brought attacking people to the forefront of LOAC debates.2  
According to current approaches to the war on terror, killing people 
has taken on a strategic importance – not just prominence – that it 
has not had in other recent conflicts.3 The rules regarding targeting 
                                                      
 *J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. (War Studies), King’s College London; 
B.A., University of Chicago.  I am grateful to Michael Reisman and Lea Brilmayer 
for helpful comments and conversations. 
1 See Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 27, 38 
1 See Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 27, 38 
(2013); NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS, 154-55 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 57, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (“The greatest source of the lack 
of clarity with respected to targeted killings in the context of armed conflict is who 
qualifies as a lawful target, and where and when the person may be targeted.”); 
Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the American 
Society of International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and 
International Law (March 25, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; Charlie Savage, At White 
House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/white-house-weighs-limits-of-terror-
fight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on the debate on killing lower-level Al Qaeda 
members). 
3 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Book Review: Extraterritorial Use of Force 
Against Non-State Actors by Noam Lubell, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/11/extraterritorial-use-of-force-against-non-
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people in non-international armed conflict continue to generate 
considerable controversy, even as they govern prominent ongoing 
policies like targeted killings. The relatively clear rules on targeting 
in international armed conflict have prompted new interpretations 
and proposals. Both sets of rules raise questions about the criteria 
and principles behind targeting rules, including the role of status, 
membership in militaries or armed groups, behavior, and threat. 
However, the rules used to distinguish between people do not include 
a fundamental concept at the heart of distinguishing between objects 
– the advantage anticipated to result from the attack.    
 This Article first explains the rules on targeting people and 
contrasts them with the rules on targeting objects, showing how the 
rules on targeting people do not require anticipated advantage. The 
second section outlines a potential advantage requirement and 
weighs arguments for and against the addition of such a requirement. 
An advantage requirement would operate over and above existing 
rules, acting as an additional layer of protection. This Article 
concludes that an advantage requirement could be a desirable, 
strategically flexible constraint that rejects the assumption that 
attacks on people promise a military advantage and serves the 
fundamental LOAC goal of reducing useless violence. 
 
I.  Attacking People and Objects Under the Law of Armed 
Conflict 
 
The regulation of attacks – “acts of violence against the 
adversary, whether in offence or in defence” – stands at the 
conceptual and practical center of LOAC.4 LOAC approaches attacks 
                                                                                                                             
state-actors/ (suggesting that the Obama administration’s drone program changed 
the character of war in the counterterrorism context). 
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. See also Nobuo 
Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law 
and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 39, 110-12 (2010) 
(distinguishing between attack and destruction). While attacks may be governed by 
other legal regimes, LOAC serves as the lex specialis in armed conflict, and this 
analysis focuses on that law. 
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as a matter of targeting, which may be defined as the selection of 
objects and people subject to or intended to be made the object of 
attack and the process by which those attacks are carried out.5 
Encompassing fundamental rules like distinction and proportionality, 
targeting law draws together key elements of LOAC. Yet, at the 
center of targeting law lies a divide. The law breaks the universe of 
potential targets into two major categories – objects and people – and 
governs those categories with different rules. This section contrasts 
the differing rules on distinction, which lacks an advantage 
requirement for targeting people, and then looks beyond distinction 
to see whether other parts of targeting law may fill the gap.  
   
A.  Distinction and People 
 
 The rules on who may be targeted vary somewhat based on 
the status of the person (combatant or civilian) and the status of the 
armed conflict (international or non-international). The law’s 
approach to distinction with respect to people focuses on two main 
categories: combatants and civilians, with key exceptions. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on 
customary international humanitarian law lists as the first rule: “The 
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians 
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. 
Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”6 The ICRC study 
                                                      
5 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 519 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the 
Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 277, 277-78 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (on the 
linear nature of the law of attack).  The definition used here was inspired partly by 
the definition used by Gary Solis with respect to objects, but it is broader in two 
ways. First, it covers people as well as objects. Second, it includes the process of 
selecting objects or people which may be attacked and not just objects or people 
against which an attack is planned. This second notion suggests that lawful attacks 
may be conducted against a category or group of objects or people; one need not 
select particular objects or individuals to be attacked. 
6 JEAN-MARIE HENCHKAERTS & LOUIS DOWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2009), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-
law-i-icrc-eng.pdf [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY]. The ICRC’s study 
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describes this rule as a “norm of customary international law 
applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts,” and explains that in this rule the term “combatant” 
indicates “persons who do not enjoy the protection against attack 
accorded to civilians,” and does not address combatant status or 
prisoner-of-war status.7 While distinctions between combatants and 
others have implications for detention and trial, the core goal of 
distinction is to determine which people and objects are open to 
attack.   
 In international armed conflict (IAC), persons are open to 
direct attack if they are members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict (excepting religious and medical personnel), participants in a 
levée en masse, or civilians directly participating in hostilities 
(DPH).8 In non-international armed conflict (NIAC), persons are 
open to direct attack if they are members of a state’s armed forces or 
an organized armed group (which constitutes the armed forces of a 
non-state party to the conflict), or civilians DPH.9 In non-
                                                                                                                             
generated considerable controversy, but this rule was not the source of it. For treaty 
law, see Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 48, 51(2), 52(1). Roberts and 
Guelff write that Additional Protocol I Article 48 reflects the principle articulated 
in the St. Petersburg Declaration that the only legitimate object is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF War 53 (Adam 
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
7 See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 3. 
8 See id. at 11-14; Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 872 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 991, 995 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance]; 
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct.18 1907 
[hereinafter Hague Regulations](on levée en masse). Medical personnel and 
chaplains are not combatants under Additional Protocol I and are not prisoners of 
war under the Third Geneva Convention. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, 
art. 43(2); Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 33, 
Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. One can conceive of these 
exceptions as the product of a sort of categorization – medical personnel and 
chaplains fall into different categories – or the product of conduct concerns, 
because those people provide distinct and sensitive services which may justify 
exemption from certain designations. 
9 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995. For a discussion of 
targeting law in NIAC and IAC, see Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’ – 
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international as well as international armed conflicts, “members of 
State armed forces may be considered combatants” for the purposes 
of distinction, though there is some resistance to the idea that 
“combatants” exist in non-international armed conflict.10 In NIAC, 
the role of non-state actors has inspired varied approaches to 
combatants and civilians, with the controversy arising largely out of 
discussions of membership in organized armed groups and civilians 
DPH, discussed in greater depth below.   
Combatants may be targeted at any time and place, even 
when they are not fighting.11 A combatant can be hors de combat and 
thus protected from direct attack in certain circumstances, for 
example when in the power of the adversary or after surrender.12    
The rules on attacking people reflect ideas about what actions 
are useful and legitimate in military operations. The 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration, an early LOAC instrument which banned 
certain explosive projectiles, states: “the only legitimate object which 
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy … for this purpose it is sufficient to 
                                                                                                                             
Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 499 (2010).  Geography 
plays an uncertain and disputed role in the rules. See, e.g., Noam Lubell & Nathan 
Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed 
Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 81-86 (2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 863 (2009). 
10 See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 11; Alston, supra note 2, 
at 19. See also Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters : Admissible 
Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 599, 605-08 (2008); Kenneth H. Watkin, Controlling the Use of 
Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
11 See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 5, at 188; Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status 
Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN THE HONOUR OF KNUT IPSEN 145, 
148 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds., 2007). 
12 See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 23(c); Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 4, arts. 41 and 85(3)(e); Geneva Convention III, supra note 8, art. 3 
(“Common Article 3”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; See also SOLIS, 
supra note 5, at 188-89. 
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disable the greatest possible number of men.”13 This legal instrument 
presents a strategic vision based on neutralizing large numbers of 
people who are members of armed forces, and this strategic vision 
underlies the rules on attacking people.   
Membership also forms the foundation for targeting rules on 
organized armed groups, members of which may be attacked at any 
time and in any place.14 The determination of membership presents 
challenges; for example, membership in an organized armed group 
other than dissident armed forces (parts of a state’s armed forces that 
have turned against their government) may be informal and may not 
coincide completely with affiliation.15 The ICRC determines 
membership in an organized armed group on the basis of a 
correspondence between the individual’s function and the conduct-
of-hostilities function exercised by the group as a whole.16 An 
alternative approach holds that membership in an organized armed 
group should be determined in the way that determines membership 
in a state’s armed forces, with the key factor being membership in an 
organization under a command structure and less emphasis placed on 
combat function.17   
 The rule that civilians are immune from attack unless they 
directly participate in hostilities, which appears in treaty and 
customary law, has generated controversy and uncertainty.18 The acts 
                                                      
13 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29 1868 (The St. Petersburg Declaration). 
14 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1006; Kevin Jon Heller, 
‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 89, 93 (2013) (“Members of an organized armed groups [sic] are 
targetable anywhere, at any time – even when they are not fighting.”). 
15 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1006-07. 
16 See Id., at 1007. 
17 See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the 
ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 641, 690-91(2010). 
18 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”); Additional Protocol II, supra note 12, art. 13(3) (“Civilians 
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.”); ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 
19-24 (Rule 6); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. ¶ 
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that constitute direct participation defy comprehensive or 
uncontroversial listing, and the determination of DPH may proceed 
on a case-by-case basis.19 Activities involving the application of 
violence may clearly constitute direct participation, while financial 
and other non-combat support may clearly be excluded.20 For 
                                                                                                                             
30 [2005](Isr.). Bill Boothby writes that “the customary rule, though distinct, 
clearly owes much to the rule in AP1.” Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: 
The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL. 741, 744 (2010).  Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions grants 
protection to persons “taking no active part in the hostilities.” See also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 699 (2010); ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance, supra note 8. See also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 11-
12 (2d ed., 2004) (presenting and assessing a list of activities that may or may not 
constitute direct participation in hostilities). For analysis of the ICRC study, see, 
e.g., Dapo Akande, Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance 
on Direct Participation in Hostilities, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 180 (2010). The 
ICRC’s claims regarding civilians DPH and restraints on the use of force were the 
subject of considerable criticism, some of which came from experts who 
participated in the study supporting the Interpretive Guidance. See, e.g., W. Hays 
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No 
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 
(2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010). 
The author of the guidance, Nils Melzer, has also elaborated on these topics in 
other works. See NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2008). Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 831 
(2010). 
19 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 177-78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT 94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 616 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); ROGERS, supra note 18, at 11-12 (presenting and 
assessing a list of activities that may or may not constitute direct participation in 
hostilities); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, 618-19 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCO
MART&articleUNID=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E [hereinafter 
ICRC COMMENTARY]. 
20 Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 60.  
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example, attacking members and equipment of enemy forces may 
clearly qualify as direct participation in hostilities, whereas working 
in a munitions factory may not.21 There have been efforts to create 
more general criteria for DPH; for example the ICRC’s three 
cumulative criteria for these acts: a threshold of harm, direct 
causation of the harm by the act or operation of which it is a part, and 
belligerent nexus governing the design of the act.22 
A key difficulty with respect to civilians DPH is the temporal 
limitations (unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities), which may allow civilians to engage in hostile acts with 
impunity, slipping back into immunity from attack if their opponents 
cannot attack or capture them while they are directly participating.23 
One possible solution to the revolving door problem is the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance’s highly contested notion of a continuous 
combat function (CCF): “In non-international armed conflict, 
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State 
party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (‘continuous combat 
function’).”24 The ICRC suggests that persons who have a CCF lose 
their protection on a continuous basis, as long as they assume their 
CCF, wherever they are and whatever they are doing.25 The notion of 
                                                      
21 See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 11; Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 61.   
22 See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995-96. See also Schmitt, 
Deconstructing, supra note 18, at 711-39. 
23 The language of Additional Protocols’ rules on civilians DPH – “and for such 
time as” – suggests that openness to direct attack is limited to the period 
surrounding the participation. See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 
996. See also Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to 
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741 (2010).   
24 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995. For a description of 
continuous combat function, see Id., at 1007. 
25 Id. at 996. This may depend on whether a person performing a CCF is a 
member of an organized armed group, who are targetable wherever they are and 
whatever they are doing. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 14, at 93 (“Members of an 
organized armed groups [sic] are targetable anywhere, at any time – even when 
they are not fighting.”). Claims regarding CCF and members of organized armed 
groups may not overlap because there may be different views as to how a person 
becomes a member of an organized group and in particular whether a CCF 
constitutes the only path to membership. See also Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 62, ¶ 
65 (discussing the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance). 
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CCF constitutes a combatant-like category which leaves persons 
open to attack regardless of their conduct. 26 Criticism of the CCF 
arises from those who think the notion leads to too narrow a scope 
for targeting and those who think it may expand the scope of 
targeting impermissibly.27 The notion of CCF may be lex ferenda, 
not lex lata.28 
Even apart from CCF, there may be a temptation to allow 
civilians DPH to lose immunity from attack on a continuous basis in 
order to prevent the revolving-door problem.29  Civilians DPH do not 
have a clear end point equivalent to retirement or demobilization, 
though surrender would certainly end direct participation.30  
Nevertheless, rules on civilians DPH challenge somewhat the idea of 
an enduring or inherent categorization, allowing targeting based on 
conduct rather than status or membership in armed forces or groups. 
 
                                                      
26 See Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’, supra note 9, at 506. 
27 See Schmitt, Deconstructing, supra note 18, at 739 (“it is necessary to 
dispense with the ‘belonging to a Party’ and ‘continuous combat Function’ aspects 
of the concept of organized armed groups, extend participation as far up and 
downstream as there is a causal link, and close the revolving door of 
participation.”); Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 65 (“[t]he creation of CCF category is, 
de facto, a status determination that is questionable given the specific treaty 
language that limits direct participation to ‘for such Time’ as opposed to ‘all the 
time.’”). 
28 See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 37.  However, the ICRC claims that “the 10 
recommendations made by the Interpretive Guidance, as well as the accompanying 
commentary, do not endeavour to change binding rules of customary or treaty IHL, 
but reflect the ICRC’s institutional position as to how existing IHL should be 
interpreted in light of the circumstances prevailing in contemporary armed 
conflicts.” ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 991 (bold removed). 
29 For example, one could treat members of organized armed groups as civilians 
DPH and expand the temporal aspect of DPH to allow them to be targeted on a 
continual basis. See LUBELL, EXTRATERROTORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 
151-52, 154. 
30 See Michael Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in 
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 
536 (2004) (“[A] civilian who participates in hostilities remains a valid military 
target until unambiguously opting out through extended nonparticipation or an 
affirmative act of withdrawal”). The mechanics of surrender are not clear in the 
context of air operations. 
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B.  Distinction and Objects 
 
The law’s approach to distinguishing between people is not 
the only way to apply the principle of distinction. In the law on 
objects, advantage plays an explicit role.  Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I provides the following definition of military objectives 
with respect to objects: “military objectives are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”31 This definition of 
military objectives contains two requirements: A) the object must 
make an effective contribution to military action, and B) the object’s 
destruction, capture or neutralization must offer a definite military 
advantage. Under this definition, even an object which contributes to 
military action by its nature – a category which covers traditional 
military objects – is subject to the demands of the second part of the 
definition which requires a definite military advantage.32 An object’s 
                                                      
31 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52(2). This definition is a norm of 
customary international law.  See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 
29-31. The literature on military objectives is extensive.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY 
BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 272-75 (1994); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
82-112 (2004); Marco Sassòli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of 
“Military Objectives” for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST 
CENTURY CONFLICTS 181 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); 
see also W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A. F. L. REV. 1, 142 
n.421 (1990) (commenting on Article 52(2)’s neglect of uncertainty and 
speculative decision-making in war).  Charles Garraway writes that in the 1991 
Gulf War, the Article 52(2) definition “proved workable.” Charles Garraway, 25 
Years of the Two Additional Protocols: their Impact on the Waging of War; 
Challenges from New Types of Armed Conflicts, in THE TWO ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS: 25 YEARS LATER 147 (Guido Ravasi 
& Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2004).     
32 Some analyses collapse the two parts of Article 52(2) into one overarching 
question, but retain the notion of advantage. See, e.g., U.S. AIR FORCE, AFP 14-
210, USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE 147 (Feb. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/index.html (stating that “[t]he key 
factor is whether the object makes an effective contribution to the adversary’s 
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status is tethered to circumstances, periods of time, and strategies; it 
does not fall into an enduring category. Under Article 52(2), even 
traditional military objects may not be military objectives. But that 
fact may lead to counterintuitive classifications, or at least 
appellations – could a fighter jet in some circumstances be a civilian 
object? Additional Protocol I offers no category for “traditionally 
military but disadvantageous or useless” objects.33 
However, other parts of Additional Protocol I reveal the 
possibility that objects can have an assumed or permanent status as 
military objectives. For example, Article 58 states that parties to a 
conflict shall “avoid locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas.”34 The ICRC’s commentary on Additional 
Protocol I states that as “regards permanent objectives [for example, 
a barracks], governments should endeavour to find places away from 
densely populated areas to site them. These concerns should already 
be taken into consideration in peacetime.”35 This provision suggests 
                                                                                                                             
military action, so that its capture, destruction, or neutralization offers a definite 
military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Sassòli, supra note 31, at 185-86 (noting the difficulty of fulfilling the second 
part of the Art. 52(2) definition of military objectives without fulfilling the first). 
The ICRC Commentary states that the “nature” category “comprises all objects 
directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, 
depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff headquarters, communications 
centres etc.”  ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 636. 
33 Additional Protocol I Article 52(1) states in part that “[c]ivilian objects are all 
objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.” Thus, the text 
suggests that all objects are either military objectives or civilian objects, and 
military objects which are not associated with the required contribution or 
advantage would thus fall outside the military objectives definition and into the 
category of civilian objects. See also Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of 
Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 69, 84 (Spring 2010) (on the example of a tank in a 
museum).  Additional Protocol I arts. 59 (on non-defended places) and 60 (on 
demilitarized zones) provide that in certain circumstances some traditional military 
objects would not be subject to attack. 
34 Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 58(b). 
35 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 694.  Sassòli states that, at least in the 
1954 Hague Cultural Property Protocol, the prohibition on placement of cultural 
property near military objectives suggests objects that could be military objectives, 
not objects that already are. See Sassòli, supra note 31, at 199. Nonetheless, there 
appears to be a presumption – like the law’s benefit of the doubt for traditional 
civilian objects – that certain objects are military objectives. Furthermore, 
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that not all determinations regarding military objectives may be 
made on the basis of anticipated military advantage “in the 
circumstances ruling” at a particular point in an armed conflict. 
Proposed lists of military objectives highlight this approach.36   
Debates within the 1999 NATO campaign over Kosovo – 
Operation Allied Force – illustrate both the assumption that certain 
objects are always legitimate military objectives and also challenges 
to that assumption. Lieutenant General Michael Short, the 
commander of the air campaign, stated in a post-campaign interview 
that “[o]ne of my peers called it ‘random bombing of military 
targets.’”37 However, some potential targets were rejected for lack of 
utility.  Harvey Dalton, standing in for the Legal Counsel to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a post-campaign conference, 
stated that “even though it was hostilities, we did not go after all 
military objects. We went after those that counted, or least the ones 
we thought counted.”38 
                                                                                                                             
Additional Protocol I Article 52(3) gives examples of objects “normally dedicated 
to civilian purposes,” identifying “a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or 
a school.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52(3). Such objects may get the 
benefit of the doubt if there is uncertainty as to whether they would meet the first 
part of the definition of military objectives in Article 52(2). 
36 See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 64, 67, 69-70, 83-85. Before offering his list, 
Rogers writes that “[t]he mere fact that an object, such as a bridge or a 
communications installation, is in the list does not mean that it is necessarily a 
military objective.  It must make an effective contribution to military action and its 
neutralization must offer a definite military advantage.” Id. at 83. See also Hague 
Rules of Aerial Warfare, Feb. 1923. See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 
supra note 6, at 139-41 (for background). While rejected in the negotiation of 
Additional Protocol I, lists of military objectives suggest that some lawmakers and 
scholars believe it is possible to state that an object is a military objective without 
undertaking the utility assessment required by Article 52(2).  
37 Interview by PBS Frontline with Michael Short, Lt. Gen., 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html 
[hereinafter Short Frontline Interview]. At the same time, there were accusations of 
LOAC violations. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO 
AIR CAMPAIGN 2 (February 2000), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf [hereinafter HRW 
NATO Report]. 
38 Harvey Dalton, Commentary: Harvey Dalton, 78 INTL. LAW STUDIES 199, 202 
(2002).  
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Unlike the definition of military objectives with respect to 
objects, the rules on which kinds of people may be military 
objectives contain no explicit advantage requirement. Instead, the 
approach focuses on status, membership, and conduct. This approach 
to distinction may presume that people who are combatants or direct 
participants in hostilities are strategically advantageous objects of 
attack; the criteria might be seen as proxies for advantage. But there 
is no requirement, for the purposes of distinction, that the individuals 
who can be made the object of an attack would be militarily 
advantageous targets. 
Though sometimes eclipsed by status- or membership-based 
approaches, conduct-based approaches may be ascendant in 
scholarship and practice.39 Conduct may be a preferable basis for 
targeting, especially when status (either combatant or civilian) and 
membership provide uncertain or inadequate guidance. Greater 
reliance on conduct may either expand or contract the scope of 
targeting rules. On the one hand, some conduct-based approaches 
may cover individuals who would not fall within the civilian DPH or 
combatant categories.40 Targeting unnamed individuals on the basis 
of conduct alone has been controversial.41 On the other hand, 
conduct-based targeting standards may operate above and beyond 
                                                      
39 See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 38 (“Several scholars have suggested that 
IHL, in both academic theory and state practice, is moving from primarily status-
based targeting towards an increased reliance on (and demand for) conduct-based 
targeting.”) (citing Samuel Issacharoff &Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: 
Individuating Enemy Responsibility, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129860 (last visited May 29, 
2013). At the same time, there may be moves toward status. See Ohlin, Crisis, 
supra note 1, at 39 (“[T]he development of the ‘continuous combat function’ 
standard could suggest a return to the primacy of status-based targeting. For some 
human rights lawyers this is a disconcerting development. However, the relative 
merits of status-based and conduct-based targeting are difficult to evaluate.”).   
40 See Heller, supra note 14, at 92-106 (examining conduct-based “signature 
strikes” and concluding that a significant number of U.S. signature strikes violate 
IHL); See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 39 (“According to Heller, while some of 
the signatures used by the United States result in attacks that are legally valid 
under IHL, others are per se illegal under international law because the signature 
may be over-inclusive and pick out targets that are neither directly participating in 
hostilities nor exercising a continuous combat function.”) 
41 See Heller, supra note 14, at 92-106. 
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existing rules, perhaps decreasing the number and scope of persons 
open to direct attack.42   
Conduct-based approaches may include or encourage 
consideration of the threat a person poses. A May 2013 U.S. 
government statement on policy standards for the use of lethal force 
outside areas of active hostilities suggests that a person who is 
targeted must pose a “continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.”43 
This threat requirement, however, operates over and above the “legal 
basis” for using lethal force.   
Conduct resembles the contribution requirement in the first 
prong of Article 52(2). This factor helps determine whether people or 
objects are targetable based on the contribution they make to the 
efforts of one’s opponent. For people, contribution is a matter of 
conduct, and may be captured by terms such as “take part” or 
“participation.” Under a conduct- and contribution-based approach, 
the contribution that targeting an individual or object will make to 
one’s own effort is not directly taken into consideration. The notion 
of contribution, but not necessarily conduct, depends at least in 
theory on utility for one’s opponent. This is not to say that the 
contribution to one’s own effort is irrelevant; it could be presumed or 
indirectly served through actions that hamper the enemy’s ability to 
advance their own aims.  
By contrast, advantage focuses on the anticipated benefits of 
one’s actions. This approach determines that people and objects are 
targetable on the basis of the attack’s potential to advance one’s 
                                                      
42 See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in 
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active 
Hostilities, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-
counterterrorism (last visited June 7, 2013). 
43 See id. (“First, there must be a legal basis for using lethal force, whether it is 
against a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that 
organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks.  Second, the 
United States will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing, 
imminent threat to U.S. persons.  It is simply not the case that all terrorists pose a 
continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons; if a terrorist does not pose such a 
threat, the United States will not use lethal force.”). See also, Blum, Dispensable 
Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 108 (proposing that distinction’s current status-
based approach to combatants should be revised to include a threat-based test.). 
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goals. For example, if an armed force faces enemy tanks – 
traditionally military objects – protecting a key site, the destruction 
of those tanks would probably promise some benefit. On the other 
hand, a tank may be passed over if an armed force wishes to leave its 
opponent’s military power largely intact.    
 
C.  Beyond Distinction: Advantage and Other Targeting Rules 
 
Do other targeting rules, for example rules on the manner in 
which attacks must be carried out rather than those which determine 
who can be targeted, impose an advantage requirement with respect 
to targeting people? Probably not.44   
 
1.  Proportionality and Advantage 
 
One key candidate for an advantage requirement is 
proportionality, which weighs anticipated damage against anticipated 
advantage.45  In some circumstances, proportionality may ensure that 
attacks on people promise to bring a military advantage. If armed 
forces anticipate that an attack will cause damage to civilians or 
civilian objects, they must also anticipate that the attack will bring a 
sufficient military advantage. If the anticipated civilian damage is 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, then under 
Additional Protocol I Article 57(2)(b) the attack must be cancelled or 
suspended. Thus, the military advantage element of proportionality 
can function as an advantage requirement in some situations.   
 However, there are several reasons proportionality may not 
impose an advantage requirement in attacks on people in at least 
some cases. Proportionality does not guarantee anticipated advantage 
                                                      
44 The rules on the manner in which attacks must be carried out may function 
differently in IAC and NIAC. But proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and 
military necessity probably exist in similar form in both international and non-
international armed conflict. See, e.g., ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 
6, at 46, 237.  
45 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
For a discussion of military advantage in proportionality, see, e.g., JUDITH 
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 100-
02 (2004).  
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when there is no anticipated civilian damage.46 Proportionality does 
not require military advantage or civilian damage; it only balances 
one against the other. Indeed, proportionality focuses on reducing 
costs, not ensuring benefits.47 Any advantage requirement that arises 
out of proportionality would be indirect in the sense that 
proportionality seeks to establish not military advantage but rather a 
particular relationship between advantage and damage. While 
proportionality may ensure that some targeting decisions are made in 
anticipation of a military advantage, it does not constitute or ensure 
an advantage requirement for targeting people.48   
 
2.  Unnecessary Suffering and Advantage 
 
Another candidate for an advantage requirement in attacks on 
people is the principle of unnecessary suffering.49 Judith Gardam 
identifies the principle of unnecessary suffering as the means by 
which LOAC “today purports to limit the impact of armed conflict 
on combatants.”50 The St. Petersburg Declaration made the goal of 
protecting combatants from useless violence an express motivation 
                                                      
46 Michael Schmitt states that “When harm to civilians cannot be avoided during 
an attack on a lawful target…proportionality applies.” Schmitt, Fault Lines, supra 
note 5, at 322. Gardam discusses the determination of military advantage first and 
the calculation of the expected level of civilian casualties second; if that discussion 
indicates a required sequence for the application of proportionality, then it suggests 
the utility determination would take place in every case. See GARDAM, supra note 
45, at 98, 102-05. 
47 See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 21-22 for a discussion of extensive damage, 
which helps indicate the secondary place of the utility assessment.   
48 Proportionality in jus ad bellum may present limits on the harm done to those 
open to attack. Gardam suggests that proportionality under jus ad bellum presents a 
requirement to limit combatant deaths, writing that because combatants are 
legitimate targets, “the level of combatant casualties never became an issue in 
[international humanitarian law] and remains a matter for the proportionality 
equation in ius ad bellum.” GARDAM, supra note 45, at 14.  
49 See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 23(e); Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 4, art. 35(2). For analysis, see, e.g., GARDAM, supra note 45; and Henri 
Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering: From 
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of 1977, 299 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98 (1994). 
50 GARDAM, supra note 45, at 14. 
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of modern LOAC in its early days. Perhaps unnecessary suffering 
has not seemed to prohibit – in some circumstances – targeting 
combatants because it has been considered useful to incapacitate as 
many of them as possible, at all times. Perhaps, if that strategic idea 
no longer corresponds to reality, unnecessary suffering will preclude 
some attacks.   
Nevertheless, unnecessary suffering probably does not 
present an advantage requirement. Unnecessary suffering is strongly 
associated with the principle of humanity, which focuses on the 
elimination or at least minimization of suffering.51 As articulated in 
one military manual, “Humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, 
injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment 
of legitimate military purposes.”52 Unnecessary suffering may not 
present an advantage requirement because it focuses on suffering 
rather than advantage, and in particular focuses on the amount of 
suffering caused by attacks rather than the decision to attack in the 
first place. But the greater challenge to the proposition that 
unnecessary suffering supplies or constitutes an advantage 
requirement in attacks on people may be a lack of supportive state 
practice. The role of unnecessary suffering in limiting the ability to 
attack people, and in particular to engage in lethal attacks, has given 
rise to considerable debate and less considerable support.53  These 
                                                      
51 Humanity may serve as a principle which motivates the development, 
interpretation, and application of LOAC rules.  See Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague IV], pmbl. ¶ 
8 (the “Martens Clause”); and Mika Nishimura Hayashi, The Martens Clause and 
Military Necessity, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: THE JUST WAR 
TRADITION AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 135 (Howard M. 
Hensel ed., 2008). But it is not clear that it functions as a rule of LOAC which 
governs the application of force. 
52 UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
23 (2004). 
53 See e.g., Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 
24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819 (2013); Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. 
L. REV. 1268 (2013); Jann K. Kleffner, Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: The End of Jus in Bello 
Proportionality as We Know It?, 45 ISR. L. REV. 35 (2012); Geoffrey S. Corn, 
Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Belligerent Targeting and the 
Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536 (2013). 
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debates often focus on the necessity-related concepts explored 
below. 
 
3.  Necessity and Advantage 
 
 Necessity is another candidate for an advantage requirement. 
In LOAC, the notion of necessity takes the form of “military 
necessity,” commonly presented as a fundamental principle.54 This 
form of military necessity can be distinguished from the explicit 
justification for exceptions to LOAC rules set out in treaties, as in 
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.55 While the principle of 
military necessity has long been considered a fundamental part of the 
law of armed conflict, the details of its nature and form are the 
                                                      
54 For analysis, see, e.g., Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of 
War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 213 (April 1998); William V. O’Brien, The Meaning of “Military Necessity” in 
International Law, 1 WORLD POLITY 109 (1957). This work is based on O’Brien’s 
doctoral dissertation: William v. O’Brien, Military Necessity; the Development of 
the Concept of Military Necessity and its Interpretation in the Modern Law of War 
(1953) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University); William Gerald 
Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. (April 
1953); Yoram Dinstein, Military Necessity, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at www.mpepil.com; and MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: 
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1994) (Originally 
published by Yale University Press in 1961 under the title Law and Minimum 
World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion). See also 
Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World 
Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L. J. 771, 826-
829 (April 1958). For an early articulation during the American Civil War, see 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Orders No. 100, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, Washington 
D.C., April 24, 1863 [hereinafter the Lieber Code]. For necessity in jus ad bellum, 
see GARDAM, supra note 45. 
55 Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV reads: “Any destruction by the 
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or 
collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to 
social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” Convention (IV) relative to 
the relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 
1949. 
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source of confusion and little rigorous analysis,56 which casts doubt 
on the principle’s ability to serve as an advantage requirement. The 
Lieber Code offers the following definition, which has influenced 
military doctrine and operations as well as some scholarship and case 
law: “Military Necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable 
for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to 
the modern law and usages of war.”57   
This definition suggests that military necessity bears a 
resemblance, at least, to the concept of utility – and may be the 
source of an advantage requirement. In this articulation military 
necessity is a mirror image of humanity, and may more directly 
address the minimization of useless force, not just useless 
suffering.58 Three questions have particular relevance for the 
existence of an advantage requirement originating in military 
necessity: 1) whether military necessity governs exceptional or 
normal actions in armed conflict, 2) whether military necessity 
presents restrictions over and above other LOAC rules, and 3) 
whether military necessity presents a strict (requiring a lack of 
alternatives) or loose (something like advantage) requirement.    
Possible answers to these questions flow from military 
necessity’s strong association with Article 52(2).59 If military 
                                                      
56 See H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 
MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 217, 218 (1991). 
57Lieber Code, supra note 54, art. 14. See also Henri Meyrowitz, supra note 49, 
at 106 (quoting the Russian Brussels Conference Draft); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Publication 1-02 (Apr. 
12, 2001, as amended through Aug. 26, 2008); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-
01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 130, n. 939 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugslavia Jan. 31, 2005) (Strugar Trial Judgment). 
58 See, e.g., UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 52, at 
23. This definition of the principle of humanity is really military necessity turned 
backwards, not its own idea. However, McDougal and Feliciano argue that even if 
this is the same idea, it makes sense to have two separate principles to emphasize 
competing values.  MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND 
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
COERCION 522 (1961). 
59 See, e.g., Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶ 295; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case 
No. IT-99-36-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶ 337 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
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necessity is captured by Article 52(2) – which governs normal rather 
than exceptional actions, constitutes a specific rule, and presents a 
loose advantage requirement – then military necessity may present 
an advantage requirement. However, in this form it may not operate 
above and beyond existing positive rules, requiring advantage where 
LOAC takes a different approach (i.e., in attacks on people). Recent 
debates highlight resistance to the notion that military necessity’s 
requirements extend beyond existing rules.  
The targeted killing and civilians DPH debates have included 
prominent interpretations of military necessity. The ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance suggests that there is a necessity-based 
restraint on the use of force against people: 
 
In addition to the restraints imposed by international 
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of 
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions 
that may arise under other applicable branches of 
international law, the kind and degree of force which 
is permissible against persons not entitled to 
protection against direct attack must not exceed what 
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.60 
 
The author of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, Nils Melzer, 
has elsewhere interpreted military necessity to present an advantage-
like requirement for targeting people. Comparing the law on people 
                                                                                                                             
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (Brđanin Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Galić, 
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, n.76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (Galić Trial Judgment); and Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment ¶ 330 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) (Strugar Appeal Judgment); Meyrowitz, 
supra note 49, at 113; Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Law on the Battlefield, 8 
U.S. AIR FORCE AC. J. LEG. STUD. 255, 258 (1997-1998); U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
NAVY, UNITED STATES NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M) (July 2007)(sections 5.3.1 on principles and 6.2.6.4.2 
on defenses). 
60 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1040. For analysis, see 
discussion below and also Garraway, 25 Years of the Two Additional Protocols, 
supra note 31, at 506-10. 
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and objects, Melzer argues that “the core criteria for the assessment 
of military necessity, namely that military action must be reasonably 
expected to lead to a ‘definite military advantage’, can be 
generalized and applied also to action against persons [in addition to 
objects].”61 Thus, Melzer posits that the law on targeting people 
contains an advantage requirement similar to that contained in 
Article 52(2), though he claims that he is not advocating the direct 
extension of that requirement to people.62     
Melzer’s ICRC study recommendation, along with his views 
on targeted killing, generated significant opposition, not least 
amongst some experts participating in the study.  Michael Schmitt, 
who participated in the ICRC study, writes in a review of Melzer’s 
“Targeted Killing in International Law” book that Melzer’s 
characterization of the kill or capture choice is “a classic example of 
lex ferenda, not lex lata.”63 Hays Parks, who also participated in the 
ICRC study, contests the claim that targeting law requires an Article 
52(2)-like assessment for people as well as objects, and otherwise 
suggests that Melzer’s work incorrectly imposes law enforcement 
and human rights standards in the LOAC realm.64  
By contrast, Gabriella Blum suggests revisions to the current 
law. First, she recommends that distinction’s current status-based 
approach to combatants should be revised to include a threat-based 
test or, as she puts it: “an obligation to assess the individual threat 
emanating from any particular human target.”65 Second, Blum 
suggests that military necessity – which she claims currently allows 
                                                      
61 MELZER, supra note 18, at 292. 
62 Id. 
63 Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Targeted Killing in International Law, AM. 
J. INT’L L. 813, 817 (Oct. 2009). See also Garraway, 25 Years of the Two 
Additional Protocols, supra note 31, at 507-10.   
64 Parks, supra note 31, at 796-97.   
65 Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 108. For a discussion 
of the threat-based approach to the use of force in contrast to LOAC’s status-based 
approach, see Garraway, 25 Years of the Two Additional Protocols, supra note 31, 
at 502, 506-510. For a discussion of the difficulty of applying a threat-based or 
human rights-based approach, see id., at 509.  Monica Hakimi’s functional 
approach to targeting comes closer to the notion of advantage, but still rests largely 
on threat.  See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and 
Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012). 
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for the killing of any combatant, regardless of threat – should be 
reinterpreted to require a “least-harmful-means test” that would 
require capturing instead of killing where possible.66 Although Blum 
is addressing the problem of needless targeting of combatants, 
neither of her recommendations would lead to an advantage 
requirement for targeting people. The first recommendation – the 
threat-based test – aligns with the idea of contribution in Article 
52(2) and conduct in rules on civilians DPH. Just because a 
combatant presents a threat to enemy forces does not mean that 
neutralizing – either capturing or killing – that combatant would 
promise an advantage.   
Blum’s second recommendation – to reinterpret military 
necessity – would dictate the choice between means, not the promise 
of utility. Here, Blum seems to presume that all the means to be 
chosen between would advance one’s ends.67 But, much like 
proportionality, this notion of necessity is orientated toward the 
minimization of harm, and advantage may fall by the wayside. 
Indeed, if both of Blum’s recommendations had the force of law, an 
armed force may be able to lawfully kill a combatant after 
determining that the combatant presented a threat and precluding 
capture, without engaging in a separate determination that attacking 
the combatant would bring an advantage. Advantage suggests that 
there can be – indeed, if advantage is a requirement, must be – 
purpose even without strict or lesser-evil necessity.  
 
II.  Adding Advantage 
  
Although some scholars have criticized the limitations of the 
current law, past proposals for the law’s development do not offer an 
advantage requirement. As outlined below, an advantage requirement 
has been absent in both lex lata and lex ferenda.   
                                                      
66 Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 114-15. Gabriella Blum 
suggests in another article that LOAC should contain a lesser-evil justification – 
which she calls a “humanitarian necessity” justification – for breaking rules: 
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2010). That piece promotes a notion of necessity familiar in some municipal 
criminal law contexts. 
67 Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 115. 
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A.  The Possible Form of an Advantage Requirement 
 
First, what might an advantage requirement look like? The 
key elements are the requirements of 1) expected advantage and 2) 
placement of expected advantage in the context of a particular time 
and strategic circumstances. The precise wording is less important at 
this stage than the general idea, but an advantage requirement might 
read: In order for a person to be a legitimate military objective, the 
wounding or killing of that person must offer a definite military 
advantage in the course of an attack or series of attacks, and in the 
context of the circumstances ruling at the time.68 If this requirement 
supplements rather than replaces current rules, as this Article 
recommends, then language could be added to clarify that this 
requirement does not replace existing rules. 
This provision largely mirrors Article 52(2), with key 
differences. First, it does not contain the first part of Article 52(2) 
regarding contribution. If utility supplements other rules, then a 
person might be targeted on the basis of their status, membership, or 
conduct and the fulfillment of the advantage requirement. Second, 
the provision clarifies the question of whether an attack might be 
considered as a whole, and whether advantage can be considered on 
a cumulative basis.69  
An advantage requirement might take various forms, 
including a legal policy or regulation, or a treaty provision. A treaty 
provision seems unlikely, as wide support is required for such a 
move and current debates reveal extensive disagreement regarding 
rules on targeting people. Another option includes a reinterpretation 
                                                      
68 LOAC recognizes that actions may not yield the advantage parties anticipate, 
and parties may be judged on what they anticipate and not on the actual usefulness 
or success of their actions. See United States v. List (The Hostages Trial), 8 L. REP. 
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 69 (U.S. Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1949). 
69 Judith Gardam suggests that military advantage cannot be assessed on a 
cumulative basis, with an eye to future rather than short-term benefits. GARDAM, 
supra note 45, at 101. But she acknowledges that some states assess military 
advantage on the basis of an attack as a whole. Id. at 102. See also DOCUMENTS ON 
THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 6, at 511 (on the United Kingdom’s understanding); 
ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 49. 
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of current legal principles (for example, military necessity). Perhaps 
the most likely form is a legal policy, creating a soft or prudential 
requirement. Like Article 52(2), an advantage requirement might 
best be seen as an expression of distinction. An advantage 
requirement could serve as an additional rather than alternative 
approach to distinction, supplementing rather than replacing rules 
based on status, membership, and conduct. As an additional 
requirement, it would only contract or shift rather than expand the 
pool of potential targets. 
If utility served as an alternative requirement – as the sole 
determinant of lack of immunity from attack – decisions would 
depend only on the strategic perspective of the attacker and high 
levels of uncertainty and dynamism would result. If the pool of 
potential targets shifts based on an estimate of utility, people might 
not be able to understand what it takes to fall within the pool and 
thus would not know whether they are in it or how to get out. An 
advantage requirement that operates over and above current rules 
would preclude this uncertainty and dynamism. At the same time, an 
additional requirement would not avoid the confusion or difficulty of 
existing rules. In the midst of confusion, interpretations which allow 
for more targeting rather than less may prevail, leaving people open 
to attack in a wider range of situations. An advantage requirement 
could provide an extra level of protection. 
 
B.  Reasons For and Against the Addition of an Advantage 
Requirement 
 
There are two main reasons to add an advantage requirement 
to the rules on targeting people. First, an advantage requirement 
would reflect strategic realities. An advantage requirement is 
flexible, acknowledging that the significance of attacking people 
varies according to circumstances. The St. Petersburg Declaration 
links the neutralization of combatants with a particular strategic 
vision that does not necessarily represent the circumstances in any 
given conflict. Just as the St. Petersburg Declaration is rooted in 
strategy, so too is an advantage requirement rooted in strategy – 
namely, the notion that it is not a given that wounding or killing 
combatants promises a military advantage. Given the diversity of 
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conflicts and strategies pursued since St. Petersburg, the utility of 
attacking combatants in armed conflict, and the centrality of 
wounding the greatest possible number of men, cannot be assumed.70 
For example, counterinsurgency operations do not necessarily benefit 
from, and often do not focus on, wounding the largest possible 
number of opponents. In addition, some recent research casts doubt 
on the effectiveness of “decapitation,” the strategy of killing a 
terrorist organization’s leadership.71 While strategic contexts vary, 
they may not often involve a conventional battlefield where disabling 
as many combatants as possible is the major if not sole goal. 
Second, an advantage requirement in the law on targeting 
people would reflect the core LOAC goal of limiting useless violence 
and destruction.72 Current rules on attacking people do not contain a 
clear mechanism for that limitation. While the St. Petersburg 
Declaration explicitly connects advantage and targeting combatants, 
its strategic vision leaves all combatants open to attack at all times, 
and there is no clear path by which new strategic perspectives can 
present an advantage requirement in the targeting of people. The 
protection of both civilians and combatants has been justified by a 
mix of reasons – a humanitarian drive to reduce suffering and a 
strategic recognition that killing certain kinds of people promises 
little or no gain. An advantage requirement might serve both 
motivations.  
Objections might challenge an advantage requirement as 1) 
unnecessary because utility will be taken into consideration through 
sources other than LOAC; 2) too costly; 3) ineffective; and 4) 
harmful to humanitarian values. 
                                                      
70 See, e.g., THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD 
MANUAL 1-141, 1-149 (2007). 
71 See Jenna Jordan, When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership 
Decapitation, 18 SEC. STUD. 719 (2009); Jenna Jordan, Killing al-Qaeda? 
FOREIGN POLICY (October 6, 2011, 5:54 PM), 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/06/killing_al_qaeda; and Jenna 
Jordan & Robert Pape, How the U.S. Can Finish Off al-Qaeda, ATLANTIC, MAY 4, 
2011. 
72 For analysis of core LOAC provisions and principles, see W. Michael 
Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
852 (2006). 
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 One possible counterargument is that an advantage 
requirement is unnecessary because considerations outside LOAC – 
for example, strategic considerations set out in military doctrine and 
plans – will ensure that advantage will be taken into consideration in 
targeting decisions. Should we not expect military forces to constrain 
their behavior to what is necessary or at least advantageous? 
However, non-legal sources alone may not ensure that targeting 
decisions will promise advantage. The use of status or membership 
as a proxy for advantage may be relatively easy, though it may be 
problematic when there is a gap between the strategic assumptions 
underlying existing rules and strategic circumstances. Moreover, an 
advantage requirement has the potential to require analysis that is 
more costly (e.g., more time-consuming) than the current proxy-
based targeting analysis, in which advantage may be assumed. And 
an advantage requirement might be costly if it led forces to pursue 
alternatives to attacks – for example, detention.73   
Second, one might argue that an advantage requirement 
would be too difficult or costly. However, an advantage requirement 
would not necessarily be more costly than existing rules, and 
additional costs may be outweighed by benefits. The analysis 
required would not necessarily depend on assessment of the threat a 
potential human target poses. While a threat-based obligation focuses 
on one’s opponent (asking, for example, whether the opponent’s 
behavior is sufficient to justify the use of force), an advantage 
requirement would draw attention to one’s own strategy as well as 
the circumstances of the armed conflict. Therefore, an advantage 
requirement would not subject armed forces to the strictures of a law 
enforcement or peacetime human rights paradigm in the midst of 
armed conflict. An advantage requirement draws less from law 
enforcement and more from armed conflict because it depends on 
                                                      
73 Benjamin Wittes has also written about incentives created by a costly 
detention policy – namely, the incentive to forego detention and engage in targeted 
killing instead. See BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND DENIAL: THE CASE FOR 
CANDOR AFTER GUANTANAMO 23-24 (2011). See also Blum, Dispensable Lives of 
Soldiers, supra note 33, at 116-17 (discussing the costs of her recommendations). 
If targeting is not possible in situations where detention is possible, then armed 
forces may be faced with a more complicated or costly capture and detention 
process as the only lawful way to neutralize an enemy.  
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advancing one’s military aim. Indeed, the notion of a useful – as 
distinct from an unavoidable and proportionate – attack hews to a 
core concern in armed conflict and LOAC: eliminating militarily 
useless violence.   
Furthermore, an advantage requirement would not preclude 
the use of proxies and categorization entirely. For example, in a 
large-scale conventional battle there may be a high-level decision 
that the neutralization of all members of opponents’ armed forces 
may be expected to bring advantage in a large geographic area for 
the course of a large campaign.  
 While an advantage requirement may raise certain costs, it 
may also remove the costs of useless violence and destruction. And 
the law already demands potentially large costs in order to protect 
people in certain ways. The U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
stated that “the rules of International Law must be followed even if it 
results in the loss of a battle or even a war.”74 In the face of 
decreasing costs of attacking people in some contexts, the effort to 
prevent useless attacks might require a more rigorous advantage 
analysis.75  
A third potential counterargument is that an advantage 
requirement will not be effective. This argument may stem from 
several concerns, including a concern about the effectiveness of 
LOAC in general. However, while an advantage requirement goes to 
the heart of military decision-making, various existing rules are just 
as invasive – most notably the advantage requirement in the law on 
attacking objects. An advantage requirement for attacking people 
may function like current rules in many scenarios, and it would 
depend on deference to commanders’ judgment as current rules do. 
The precise form of an advantage requirement may influence 
its effectiveness. Policies and legal clarifications may – for military 
and humanitarian reasons – emphasize strategic sensitivity, even if 
                                                      
74 Hostages Trial, 8 L. REP. TRIAL WAR CRIM., at 66-67. But see Schmitt, A 
Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 6. 
75 See Eric Posner, The Killer Robot War Is Coming, SLATE, May 15, 2013 (2:57 
PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/05/dro
ne_warfare_and_spying_we_need_new_laws.html. 
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this is more than the law demands. Indeed, LOAC is a baseline 
standard that may be greatly surpassed in restrictiveness by policy, 
for example in the form of rules of engagement. But policies can be 
abandoned. Furthermore, advantage would exist amidst – and 
sometimes as part of – various other principles and considerations, 
and may be lost in the shuffle. Even if there were an advantage 
requirement for targeting people, it may not have much effect 
because other factors – including categorization and contribution – 
may be considered sufficient to justify targeting decisions. 
If parties do wish to abide by an advantage requirement, 
technological advances may make it more achievable. For example, 
the ability of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA or drones) to reconnoiter 
for extended periods of time and thus gain extensive information on 
potential targets may allow forces to make more agile and frequent 
advantage assessments. Ultimately the functioning of an advantage 
requirement presents an empirical question to be addressed in 
subsequent analyses.   
Fourth, one might argue that an advantage requirement would 
subvert humanitarian goals because it depends on parties’ military 
concerns and goals. But an advantage requirement would not burst 
an air-tight bubble of civilian protection. First, the law on targeting 
people already includes provisions on civilians DPH which break 
through categories and make the more dynamic notion of conduct a 
determining factor in some attacks. Furthermore, as a supplemental 
rather than alternative requirement, it would create more rather than 
fewer restrictions. An advantage requirement might reduce suffering 
more, and for a wider range of people – e.g., combatants as well as 
civilians. 
In summary, an advantage requirement might flexibly reflect 
a wide variety of strategic contexts, and serve the core LOAC goal of 
reducing useless violence and destruction. The confusion 
surrounding existing rules on attacking people may make the 
addition of an advantage requirement even more compelling. Further 
information may be needed in order to determine the value and 
desirability of an advantage requirement.  
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Conclusion 
 
Current approaches to distinction allow a person to be 
attacked even if the destruction or neutralization of that person does 
not promise to bring a military advantage. The law contains an 
explicit advantage requirement for objects but not people through 
differing approaches to the principle of distinction. Other potentially 
applicable rules probably do not present an advantage requirement 
for the targeting of people. Proportionality offers an indirect and 
occasional advantage requirement. Critiques of purported and 
proposed restraints based on unnecessary suffering and military 
necessity highlight the uncertainty of those potential sources of 
advantage.  
While advantage raises questions at the heart of both law and 
strategy, convenience and assumptions about the utility of attacking 
people may prevent it from playing a more central role in attacks on 
people. At the same time, current developments may push in the 
direction of a reorientation of the law toward a greater concern for 
achieving benefits – a reorientation which an advantage requirement 
would promote. As technology lowers the costs of attacking people, 
even those outside easily recognized battlefields and military forces, 
a greater emphasis on the achievement of benefits may help prevent 
useless attacks. And in the midst of confused rules regarding which 
people are open to attack, an advantage requirement might provide 
an additional, flexible layer of protection and a reflection of the core 
LOAC goal of limiting useless violence and destruction.   
